On Context Dependence In Modal Constructions by Frank, Anette & Kamp, Hans
O n  Context Dependence III Modal Constructions 
Anette Frank and Hans Kamp 
Rank Xerox Research Centre and University of Stut tgart 
This paper invest igates a new representat ion format for dynamic discourse in 
D RT,  where contextual dynam i cs is modeled i n  terms of update condit ions .  
This new representation format i s  motivated by the study of context depen­
dence in modal constructions, i n  particular by serious problems besetting ear­
lier approaches to modality and modal subordination in DRT.  We present an 
alternative DRT analys i s that provides a unified analys i s of relative modality 
and modal subordination, and which accounts for a wider range of data as 
regards modal subordination relative to negation and graded modal context.s .  
1 .  Introduction 
One of the d i st inguish ing featu res of DRT i s i ts focus on representat ional 
aspects of meaning . Another important characteristic of the theory is the in­
sight that the mean ing of sentences cannot be determined by truth condit ional 
semanti cs proper. A pervasive feature of natural language semant. i cs i s  that. it 
i s  essential ly dependent on (material in t roduced with in ) the previous d iscourse 
context ; DRT and FCS were t.he first sema.ntic theories that made this specific 
kind of context dependence formally precise ( Kamp ( 1 98 1 ) , IIeim ( 1 982) ) .  
To account for anaphoric binding i n  donkey sentcnces ( l a) , D RT and 
FSC a.ss ign the condit ional a ' dynamic '  analys is , which is ' i n ternal ' i nasmnch 
as i t  concerns the relation between the antecedent and t h e  scope. It i s  'exter­
nally stat ic '  in t hat the dynamically ' augmented ' contexts of the antecedent 
and consequent are ' i nv isi b le from the outside ' ,  i .e . , from the vantage point 
of the condi t ional as a whole .  This accounts for the fact that the indefini te 
in the antecedent of the first sentence of ( l a) can serve as antecedent for the 
pronominal i n  i t s  scop e ,  b u t  not for t h e  pronoun in  t h e  :;ecoIl d sentence .  
( 1 )  a .  I f  a farmer owns a donkey, h e  beats it. # H e  doesn 't l ike it . 
b. If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. It might kick back . 
S ince Roberts ( l 989)  i t  is wel l-known that there are exceptions to th i s  rule .  In  
Roberts '  account the cond i t ional i s  analyzed as externally stat ic  but. internally 
dyn am ic to account for ( l a) ,  whi le in  'moda.1 subordination ' contexts ( l b )  a 
special accommodat ion device may app ly, to make material t hat is embedded 
within the antecedent or scope of the condi t iona.! accessible for anaphori c bind­
ing . Geurts(  1 09.5) proposes a presl 1ppositional accoun t. of modal su bordination 
that i s more restr ict ive than Roberts ' a.ccommodation analys is .  
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Both Roberts ' and Geurts '  DRT analyses are reconstructions of Kratzer ' s  
( 1 978 , 1 99 1 )  analysis of  relative and graded modality. However,  t heir D RS rep­
resentations do not dist inguish between, e .g . , deont ic and epistemic modali ty, 
nor between indicat ive and counterfactual conditionals .  Geurts '  analysis does 
not account for modal subordinat ion relati ve to a negated context , and does 
not appropriately render the context dependence of modal sentences that are 
to be interpreted as being relative to the preceding factual discourse. 
We propose a new representation format for dynamic discourse in  D RT ,  
which allows u s  to state a unified analysis of relat ive modal ity and modal sub­
ordination that reconstructs Kratzer 's notion of context dependent or relative 
modality at  the DRS level, and thus accounts for the problems j ust ment ioned .  
2 .  Context dependence in modal constructions 
There i s  a broad consensus nowadays that modal verbs, much l ike frequency 
adverbials , are best analyzed in  terms of generalized quantification . Th i s  view 
not only leads to a natural analysi s  of graded modals ( p robably, unlikely) , but­
more important ly-it captures the inherent context dependence of modal con­
structions :  as e .g . pointed out recently by von Fintel ( 1 995 ) ,  generalized quan­
t ifiers can be taken to involve a variable of an appropriate type, which gets 
interpreted in context and thus determines-in conj unction w i th  the restric­
tive clause-the quantificational domain .  For modal operators this v iew was 
ant i ci pated by Kratzer ( 1 978) , who characterized modal operators as bei ng rel­
ative to ,  or contextually dependent on,  d ifferent kinds of in tensional con texts . 
2. 1 Relative and graded modality 
The i mpact of Kratzer 's analysis  of relative modality is that modal expres­
sion s ,  e .g .  must in ( 2 ) ,  are not semantically ambiguous between different read­
i ngs traditional ly classified as epi.s temie, deontic or circumstantial, but that 
there is a neutral modal operator that is contextually dependent on d iffer­
ent k inds of i ntens ional background con t exts-ep istemic (2<1) , deont ic  ( 2b )  and 
circumstant i al (2c)-that const itute i t s  modal base (Kratzer{l99 1 : 639/640 ) ) .  
( 2 ) a. ( In view of the availab le  evidence , )  Jockl must be the murderer . 
b .  ( In vie w  of what the law provides , )  Jockl must go to j ai l .  
c .  ( In view of t he  present state o f  his nose etc . , )  Jockl must slleeze. 
Kratzer(  1 98 1 )  extends this analys is  to the concept of gra ded modality, i . a .  in 
order to account  for deon t i c  and counterfactual modality ( 3 ) , where the modal 
operator i s  analyzed as doubly rela tive:  Graded modality involves a second 
background  context , the ol'de ring s o u rce o( w) , wh ich i nduces a partial order 
:::; o (w ) on the set of worlds determi ned by the modal base f ( w ) . For the deont ic 
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condit ional (3a) , the modal operator is relat ive to a circumstantial modal 
base and a deontic ordering source, while the counterfactual (3b) is analyzed 
relative to an empty modal base and a totally realistic ordering source. 
(3)  a .  If Max buys  a car , he  must pay taxes . 
b .  If Max had bought a car , he would have paid taxes . 
As is brought out by (4 ) ,  modal subordination is to be viewed as a special in­
stance of the more general phenomenon of relative modality: in (4a) the modal 
base is  not given by l inguist ic means ,  and therefore must be accommodated ; in 
(4b)  t he modally subord inated sentence is  interpreted relative to the context 
set up by the scope argument of the first , modalized sentence (which in turn 
i s  to be i nterpreted as r·e/ative to some accommodated background  context ) . 
( 4 )  a. ( Cleo i s  nominated for th e  first race . ) Cleo might win  the first race. 
b .  Suppose C leo were nominated for the first race . She would certainly 
win ( i t ) .  
2. 2. DRT accounts of modal subordination 
Kratzer ' s  analysis of relative and graded modality i s  wel l  suited to cope with 
anaphoric b ind ing and presupposi tion projection out of modal contexts ,  and 
th i s  is the  main  reason why i t  was ' reconstructed ' i n  various theories of modal­
i ty in the framework of DRT ,  as e.g. Roberts ( 1 989 ) and Geurts(l !J95 ) . Now , 
whi le both Roberts '  and Geurts '  theories are bui lt on Kratzer ' s  analysis of 
relative and graded modality, we argue t h at they do not t reat modal subordi­
nation as a special instance of relat ive modality. 
Roberts ' accommodation account .  Fol lowing Kratzer ' s analysi s ,  modal 
operators are interpreted relative to a modal base and an ordering source ,  
which denote sets of proposit ions, but are not defined in  the D RS language 
and therefore are not represented in the DRS .  The impact of Robert s '  theory 
is to allow for accommodation of ( sub )DRSs in order to account for modal 
subord inat ion :  in  (5) the modal base of the necess ity operator is further re­
stricted by accommodation of the scope DRS of the previous modal structure 
into the restri ctor DRS of t he second ,  ' subord inated '  modal construction . 
( 5 ) A thief might break i nto the house. He would take the s i lver .  
x 
I I 0 thief(x ) break- into- the-holl se( x )  
x y 
thief(x ) 0 y = x 
break- i nto-thc-hO llse ( x) take-s i l vcr(y) 
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A general problem of the accommodation account i s  that i t  i s  too unrestricted 
( see Geurts ( 1 995) ) .  Moreover, the analysi s doesn ' t  dist inguish between epis­
temic (5) and deonti c  modality ( 6 ) :  (6a) i s  assigned a DRS that is structurally 
i dentical to ( 5 ) ,  and similarly (3a-b)  are assigned identical DRSs ( modulo 
tense ) .  The semanti c  dist inction between epistemic  and deonti c  modality is 
only available at the level of the verification condit ions . This i s  unsatisfactory 
in particular in cases l ike (6b) , where the deont i c  context i s  introduced by 
l inguist ic means :  the context dependent interpretation of the deontic sentence 
cannot , then , be represented in the DRS .  Thus, Roberts '  theory is  a hybrid 
theory : relat ive modality i s  only captured in  terms of verificat ion condit ions ,  
while modal subordination, a special i nstance of relati ve modality, i s  accounted 
for ,  by the accommodation mechanism, at the level of the DRS .  
( 6 )  a. A fireman may break into the  house. He must rescue the  chi ld .  
b .  According to German tax law ,  Max must pay taxes for his car . 
Geurts ' presuppositionaljanaphoric account .  Geurt s '  theory is also bui l t  on 
Kratzer's analysi s ,  while focussing  on the phenomenon of presupposit ion pro­
j ection . It diverges from Roberts ' account in that a modal is taken to presup­
pose its domain ,  thereby taming the powerfu l device of accommodation.  The 
DRS language i s  enriched by propositional referents p, q, which denote sets of 
world-function pairs .  Such referents can bui ld terms p+ f{, "the indexed propo­
sit ion denoted by p incremented w i t h  the information in f{" ( Geurts ( 1 995 :8 1 ) ) .  
Modal operators are represented as relat ions between proposit ional terms p 
and q ( see ( 7 ) ) ,  and are assigned the mean ing i n  ( 8 ) ,  where the ordering source 
a is a set of propositions and a, a' sets of world-funct ion pairs .  Modal subor­
dination i s  analyzed in terms of a ( vari an t of) the theory of presupposit ion as 
anaphora ( van der Sandt ( 1 992) ) :  the presupposi t ional domain q of a subordi ­
nated modal i s  bound to a referent p established by  the  restrictor or scope of 
a preceding modal sentence. It  is easi ly seen that a presupposit ional t heory of 
modality-in conjunction with accessibility constraints for (presuppositional ) 
b inding-is more restricted than Roberts '  accommodation account .  
( 7 )  A th ief m ight  break in .  He  would take t h e  si l ver . Geurts ( 1 995 :86/87) 
p q q '  
q = p + I �lief(x) break- in(x) I p O  q q' = q + I take-si lver(x) I q 0 q '  
( 8 )  Let a be some given ordering source. Then : Geurts ( 1 995 :90 )  
Iw{ D ) ={ {a, a' ) : VS Ea ,  3tEa ,  t :::; o(w) 05 & Vt'Ea ,  i f t '  :::; o(w) t then { 'EO" } 
Iw( O) = { (a, a' ) : 305 E a, Vs' E a, if 05 ' :::; o (w)  s then 05' E O" } 
But t he theory suffers from two main prob lems . First , as in Roberts '  analysi s 
the ordering source i s  not represented in the DRS ,  bl lt only figures i n  the 
verificat ion cond i t ion ( 8 ) .  The epistemic vs . deonti c  sentences ( 3a-b )  are thus 
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assigned identical DRSs .  It i s  also not possi ble to represent the presupposi­
t ionall anaphorically dependent meaning of deont ic sentences that are to be 
interpreted as being relative to  a deont i c  antecedent context that is overt ly 
introduced by the preceding discourse (6b ) .  
Another problem (acknowledged by Geurts )  i s  that the analys is doesn ' t  
account for modal subordination relat i ve to negation contexts (9 ) .  S ince there 
i s  no proposi tional referent available that could bind the presupposed modal 
base of the counterfactual , the pronominal anaphor cannot be resolved . 1 
(9 )  I don ' t  have a m icrowave oven.  I wouldn ' t  k now what to do w i t h  i t .  
This  problem i s  of  a more general nature: the analysis cannot account for 
relative modality wrt .  the factual antecedent context ,  as i l lustrated by ( 1 0 ) .  
While the presupposit ional modal base i s  clearly dependent o n  the context i n­
troduced by the first sentence , there i s  no propos it ional referent that i dentifies 
this context .  The modal base of the condit ional can on ly be accommodated . 
( 1 0 )  There are two people i n  the  room. If one  of  them leaves the  room, there 
will  s t i l l  be one person in the room . 
Y x p q r 
peopJe(Y) I Y I = 2 room (x) in (Y,x)  
p = ? q = P + I � E Y leave(y,x} I r = q + I � E Y in(z ,x )  I q 0 r 
3 .  ADRSs and the represent ation of contextual dynamics 
Frank (  1 996 )  pursues an analys i s  of modality and modal subordinat ion that 
fol lows the spir i t  of Kratzer 's theory of relative modal i ty, whi le d i verging from 
her analysis of deont i c  and counterfactual modali ty as involving graded modal­
ity. As in  Geurts '  analys is  we make use of context referents G, H ,  denoting sets 
of world-function pairs ,  and which can bui ld 'annotated ' or updat e  conditions 
G : :  F + [{'.  The notion of relative modality i s rendered in terms of an anaphoric 
context referent X' that figures i n  the  domain argument of a general i zed modal 
quantifier. The logical form of modal operators i s  as i n  ( 1 1 ) .  Rel ati ve modal­
i ty and i ts  speci al instance of modal su bord i n at ion are captured in  terms of 
anaphol'ic binding of the modal operator 's ( possi b ly  complex) modal base X' . 2 
( 1 1 )  
X '  G H 
X '  = ? 
G : : x' + 0 Q H : : G + � 
But evident ly, bei ng very similar to Geurts '  app roach , this anaphoric analysi s  
does n ' t  solve the above men t ioned problem for exam p l es l i ke ( 1 0 ) e i t her : the 
D RS wi l l  not contain any contex t referen t  that represents the p i ece of d i s-
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course introduced by the first sentence. The condit ional cannot , therefore, be 
analyzed as anaphorically dependent on the preceding factual discourse con­
text i n  terms of anaphoric b inding of i ts  modal base XI . 
.'J. l .  From rela t ional semantics for DRSs t o  update  conditions 
DRT's main ins ight is that the meaning of a sentence is essent i ally context 
dependent ,  that each sentence must be interpreted relative to its preceding con­
text, or "as an add i t ion to ,  or ' update '  of, the context i n  which i t  i s  used" ( van 
Eij ck&Kamp ( 1 997 : 1 7 9) ) .  Following this dynamic perspective, the mean ing  of 
a sentence i s  to be captured i n  terms of context change condi t ions rather than 
i n  terms of truth cond i t ions  proper. To make this view formally precise van 
Eij ck&Kamp( 1 997) define a relat ional , or dynamic semanti cs for DRSs ,3 where 
the meaning of a ( parti al )  DRS D is stated as a relation between i nput and 
output. ass ignments s and S l  from i n di viduals of U into M: . [D]�.  But not only 
does th i s  relational semant ics account for the dynamic meaning of sentences i n  
discourse. B y  extension of the DRS language with the sequen cing operator ' i '  
DRSs now expl ic it ly represent  t.he dynamics o f  d i scourse : ., [D i  DI] �  if  th ere 
is an s" with ., [D]�  and s,, [DI] �  ( see van Eij ck&Kamp( 1 997) ) .  
Yet ,  the dynamic  aspect of meaning that i s  thus built i n to t h e  semanti cs 
and representat ion of D RT is st i l l  of no help for the problem we encountered 
for ( 1 0 ) :  the states s , Sl that record the assignments of referents i ntroduced 
in the  preceding ' i npu t '  context are not in the object language , and therefore 
cannot serve as representational objects to prov ide a context-type antecedent 
for the anaphori c modal base of the modal operator. But i t  i s  obvious how the 
dynamic view on the semantics of DRSs can be imported into the DRS syn­
tax ,  so as to yield an explicit representation of this contextual dependence of 
sentence meaning. Modulo the i ntensional framework , there i s  a direct corrc­
spondence between the relational semantics of DRSs and update condit ions on 
context referents ( 1 2 ) ,  where context referents denote sets of world-funct ion 
pairs ( see below for ful l  definit ion ) :  an u pd ate condit ion G : : F + f{1 charactcr­
i zes the 'update '  of an ' i nput '  context (referent)  F with a DRS f{1 ,  to yield the 
'output ' context ( referent ) G,  where e(G) denotes the set of states (wl , g) for 
which there is a state (WI , ! )  E e ( F) s . th .  (WI , !) and (wl , y) const itute correct 
i nput and output states i n  the relational meaning of 1"":/ :  (wl ,j )  [K/] (wl,g ) . 
( 1 2 )  (w ,  e ) pM G : :  F + f{1 i ff e ( G)={ (WI , g) : ( � (Wl , !) E e ( F ) )  ( wl ,j ) [f{I] (WI ,g ) }  
3. 2. Representa tion of contextual dynamics in DRT 
Instead of using update condi t io l l s  G : :  F + f{1 for ' subordinate' con text s  
only, we  now extend the  use o f  these condit ions to expl i ci t ly represent the  dy -
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namics of a di scourse wi th in  the DRS that i s  to represent its dynamic meaning .  
We wil l  first  out l ine the main i dea by going through the cri t ical examples , and 
then , in 3 . 4 . ,  i ntroduce the semantic  formalism in much more detail . 
Let us first consider how the problemati c  example ( 1 0)  works out wi th in 
this new representation format . In  ( 13 )  t h e  first sentence, 51 , i s  represented 
as context dependent upon an antecedent context referent F in  terms of the 
update condi tion G : :  F + Kr , where KJ corresponds to the D RS t hat. is to 
be constructed for 51 . The second sentence, 52 , i s  in  turn characterized as 
context dependent on the antecedent context establ ished by the first. sentence, 
represented by the referent G, in terms of the update condition H : : G + K2 , 
with K2 the representat ion to be constructed [or 52 . Once the accessi bil ity 
condit ions for anaphoric b inding are i n  place ( see 3 .4 . ) ,  i t  wi l l  fal l  out that the 
context referent G t hat represents the content conveyed by the first sentence 
is accessible for the anaphoric referent X' , the modal base of the condi t i onal 
within  K2 , and that-via  this anaphoric depen dency-th e  anaphori c expres­
sions th em and the room find access ible referents ,  defined in  the universes of If, 
and Ko . Unbounded presupposit ions are accommodated i nto the ' highes t '  pos­
sible DRS,  accessible from the context the presupposi t ion projects from, here 
the DRS Ko that is interpreted relat ive to the empty context A the d i scourse 
starts out with :  e ( A )  = { (w' , '\ ) : w' E IV} , '\ the empty [unction . 
( 1 3 )  There are two people in  the  room . I f  one o f  t h em leaves t h e  room , t here 
wil l  st i l l  be  one person in the room . 
A F G H  
F : : A + �oom(r) I 
G : : F + Y in(Y ,r) I people(Y) I Y 1 = 2  the_room er )  
H'  H" X' 
X '  = G y � H" : : HI +  z H : : G + If' : : X' + y E Y  z E Y 
leave(y, r ) in ( z ,r) 
s. S. A unified ana lysis of relative modality and modal subordinat ion 
An  an alys i s  along these l i nes immed iately accounts  for modal subordination 
as in  ( 1 4 ) :  the first cond i t ional i s  represen ted as being nlative to  the (empty 
or accommoda.ted ) factual context F ,  enabl i n g  anaphoric or presuppos i t ional 
binding into the ' main context ' ,  while the second condi t ional i s  rclalivf' l o  t he  
modal context  established by  the  first conditional i n  terms of  anaphori c refer­
ence to the referent G" that ' annotates ( : : )' its scope DRS.  Accessi b i l i ty m u s t  
be defined so as to l i cense binding of X" to Gil , and-via th i s  cond i t ion­
bi nding of anaphoric expressions with in  the  DR Ss annotated by H' or H" to 
material that is defined within the D RSs annotated by G' and G" ( see 3 .4 . ) .  
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( 14) If a thief breaks into the house, h e  wil l take the si lver . 
If i n  addit ion he finds the safe he will try to open i t  , 
A F G H  
F : : A + y w v  house(y) silver(w) safe(v) I 
G' G" X' x 
X' = F 
G : : F +  G'  : : X' + 
thief(x) 
the_house(y) 
breaLin(x,y)  
<> G" . .  G ' + 1 tksilver(w)  1 . .  , t,ake( x ,w ) 
H' H" X" 
X" = G" H : : G + 
H' : : X" + 1 tksafe( v) 1 <> H" : : II' + I try-open( x , v )  I fi n d ( x , v )  
It  is easy to see that th is  analysis caracterizes T'e/ative modality an d modal 
subordination as a unified phenomenon : in both cases the anaphori c  modal 
base is bound to an accessi b le context referent introduced by the preced ing 
d iscourse. As we argued for (4 ) ,  the difference between the  two types of context 
dependent modality i s  captured by the fact that in the fi rst instance ( 1 3 )  the  
antecedent referent denotes a ' factual ' (nonmoda.l ) contex t ,  whereas i n  the 
modal subordinat ion instance of ( 1 4 )  the anteceden t referent denotes a modal 
context ,  i ntrodu ced by the preceding condit ional . 
The analysis also accounts for modal subordi nation relat ive to n egated 
contexts ( 9 ) , which was n ot captured by Geurts '  analys is :  
( I S) I d idn't  buy a microwave oven . I wouldn ' t  know what to do w i t h  i t. 
A F G I 
F : : A + 
G : : F + 
I : :  G + 
i speaker(i) I 
� . . F x . H I  II . . + ffilcrowave-oven(x) buy( i ,x )  I 
I' I" X'  
X' = H 
� J . . I ' I knOw-what-to- 1 I ' : : x ' + D <> I" : : I' + ' . . + do-wi th ( i ,x) 
In 3 . 4 .  we define negati on to take s cope over an upd ate condit ion .  The coun­
terfactual in ( 1 5 ) can then be represented a s  anapho ric to the referent Il ,  
w h i ch denotes a counterfactual context where Max bought a microwave oven . 
The an a l y s i s  of deont ic  modals differs from Kratzer 's graded modality. 'l 
The modal base of the deont i c  modal is complex: it is anaphoric to a con­
text F + D, F a factual context ,  D a context referent represent ing a deont ic 
context , which i s  i ntroduced by l inguist ic  means as  in ( 1 6 ) ,  or e lse must. be ac­
commodated as Qbligation (D} . The dist inct ion betwee n  deont ic an d ep i stemic 
modal i ty i s  now explicitly represented , in term s of a context referent D that 
i n  virtue of being an argu ment of a deontic predicate qualifies as deontic .  
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( 1 6 )  According to German tax law ,  Harry must pay taxes. 
A F G  
F : : A + D h  harry(h) I German-tax-law( D) 
G ' G" X' 
G : : F + X
' = F + D  6 
G ' : : x' + D emy G" : :  G' + I pay-taxes(h) 
3.4 .  Verification, wellfoundedness and accessibility 
I 
We briefly present a semantics for the representations mot i vated above. In (2 1 ) 
( which is based upon a s impler language5 ) an update condition G : :  F + [{' 
i n  ( 2 1 e) not only defines a proper context change potent i a.! for K' , but also 
cons t rains [{' to hold true relative to the eval uation state (w, e) . Two aspects 
requ i re more detailed d iscussion : the evaluation of [{' relat i ve t.o e-<G U f in 
(2 1e-g) and the normalcy restr iction * for modal quantifiers (2 1 g ) . 
The normalcy selection function * (w , G) ,  to be defined in  the model , 
denotes the  set of worlds where everything holds tru e  which is normally the 
case,  relative to  w, in the context G (d. Morrcau ( 1 992 ) ) . I n  (2 1g) th is  normalcy 
select ion function constrains the set of states in the  quantificational dOImli n ,  
which al lows u s  to cope with condit ional variahi l i ty o r  nonmonotonicity ( sec 
Frank ( 1 996 ) ) ,  and , moreover, to account for modal subordinat ion relat i ve to 
modal constructions host ing the quantifier no (see 4 . 2 . ) .  
I n  update condit ions G : :  F + [{ '  ( 2 1 e ) the D RS K '  must b e  intcrp rctcd 
rel at ive to a complex function e-<G U f (defined by ( 20 ) ) .  T h i s  is necessary, 
e .g . , i n  order to allow for accessibi l i ty of context referents defined in Un from 
with in a DRS K' , where G : : F + f{' E Conn . Th i s  s i tuat ion is found, e .g .  
i n  ( 1 3 ) ,  and i s  represented by the schemat ic  D RS ( 1 7 ) .  S ince F i s  free i n  f{1,  
the  function 9 that i s  to verify [{' shou l d be defined for F and shou ld  assign 
i t  the  value that i s  fixed by e .  S ince F E dom( e ) , i t  seems straightforward to 
evaluate [{' i n  (2 1 e) relati ve to a state e U f. But t. h i s  leads to t he problem 
of non-wellfo 1lndedness: in ( 1 7 ) ,  G E dom( e ) ,  in part i cu lar ,  G denotes a set 
of pairs (W' , g) . If [{' i s  evaluated relat. ive to a state (Wi ,  e U f), G will be in 
the dom ain of e U f, and G will thus be in the dom ain  of every 9 in pairs 
(w' , g )  E e (G ) : That is , e (G)  would give the  standard set-theoret ic not ion of 
a function belongi ng  to i t s  own trans i t i ve closure and thus violate the Axiom 
of Foundat ion . In other words, (w, e) does not ver i fy f{. f{ i s  logical l y  false . 
F G  
( 1 7 ) G : : F +� 
To guarantee wel l foundcdncsH we rien ne, i n  ( 1 8 ) ,  a rel at ion < on context ref­
erents which records the embcdd ing structure of context referents relat ive to 
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an embedding function e, e = el U e2 where e l : Uindre!_K -+ UwE W Uw,M , e2 : 
Ucre!_K -+ �( W x G) as i n  (21 ) . The set of context referents X i s  defined as a 
part ial ly  ordered system (X,  < ) ,  which i s  const rained to be well founded ( 1 9 ) .  
B u t  note that even wi th ( 1 9 ) we st i l l  cannot assign a meaning to DRSs l i ke 
( 1 7 ) :  i f  K' is evaluated relat ive to e U f ,  9 wil l  be undefined, s ince G being i n  
i t s  domain immediately violates wellfoundedness as defined by ( 1 9 )  and ( 1 8 ) .  
( 1 8) F < e G i s  the smallest relation bet.ween context referent s  F, G E X 
relat ive to an embedding function e s . th .  
V(w' , g) E e 2 (G) : FE dom (g2 ) or V(w' , g) E e2 (G) : :lXE dom (g2 ) :  F <gX .  
( 1 9 )  A function e = el U e 2  for ADRSs i s  wel/founded i ff 
dom( e2 )  � X and (X ,  < ) wel/founded. 
In (2 1 ) wellfoundedness is therefore ensured 'on the fly ' ,  by defin ing K' i n  up­
date condi t ions G : :  F + K' to be evaluated relative to states (w' , c-<G U J) , w i th 
e-<G defined i n  ( 20 ) .  Intuit ively, dome e-<G )  i s a subset of dom ( e )  which contains 
only those context referents X that are ' smaller ' ,  i n  terms of the relation <c 
( 1 8 ) ,  t han G, and which wi l l  thus not cause 9 to be non-well founded . 
( 20) Let e = el U e2 be a well founded embedd ing function for ADRSs ,  then 
e-<o = C l U e� ,  where e; = e2 r {X E dom ( e2 ) : X 1= G & G </ e X } . 
( 2 1 ) Let J( be a DRS ( UK = Uindre!-K U Ucref-K ,  ConK ) , wi th  ConK a set 
of condit ions of the form referred to in  ( a-i ) ,  j\.tf an intensional model 
( see Kamp&Reyle ( 1 996 ) )  and e a wellfounded embedding function c = 
el U e2 wh ere el : Uindre! _K -+ UwE W Uw,M and e2 : Ucref_K -+ �( W x G) 
(G  a set of embedding functions ) and e ( A ) = W x {A} , A the empty 
function . * is a normalcy selection function , defined in t he model , which 
yields , for a world w and a context (a set of world-funct ion pai rs ) G 
the set of worlds * (w , G ) where Everything holds tru e which is n o rmally 
lhe  case, relative to w, in th e context G (cf. Morreau ( 1 992 ) ) . 
(w , e ) PM K i ff  :If : e �uJ( f & v,· E ConK : (w ,  J) PM , .  
[ [{D (w .J )  = { (w , g) :  f �UJ( 9 & V, E ConK : (w , g) PM , } . 
(w .J ) [KD (w ,g) iff f �uJ( 9 & V, E ConK : (w , g) PM , .  
a .  - d .  atomic  D R S  condit ions (sec Kam p&Reyle (HJ93 , 1 996) ) 
c. (w , e )  PM G : :  F + [(' iff e (G) = { (w' , y) : :I (w' , J) E e ( F ) s . t h .  
( w' ,e-<ouj) [J('D (w',g) } & :I (w , g) E e ( G) . 
f. (w ,  e) PM -, G : : F + [{' iff e (G)  = { (w', g) : :I (w ' ,  J) E c (F )  s . t.h . 
(w' ,e-<o udK'D (w',g) } & -, :I (w, y) E e ( G) .  
g . (w , e )  P1H G : : X' + K '  M H : : G + [{" iff 
e ( G) = { (w' , g) : :I (w' , x ')Yc( X ' ) s . th . (w' , e -<oux,} [ [{'] (w' ,g } }  & 
e (H )  = { (w' ,  h )  : :I (w' , g) E e (G) s . t. h . (w' , e-< H U9} [J("] (w' ,h) } & 
(A ,  B)  E QuantM ( Q ) ,  where 
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A = { ( w' , g ) :  (w' , g)  E e(G) & 
w' E * (w ,  { (w", g' ) : 3 (w" , x') E e (X' )  sth.  (wU ,e-<aUx') [K'] (wu,g} } ) } & 
B = { (w' , g) : (w' , g) E e ( G) & 
w' E * (w , { (w" , g') : 3 (w" , x' ) E e (X') sth . (wU ,e-<G ux,} [K'] (wu,g} } )  & 
't:/(w' , g) :  (w' , g) E e ( G) & 
w' E * (w , { (w", g' ) : 3 (w" , x') E e ( X') s . th . (wU ,e-<G ux,} [K'] (wu,g} } )  
-+ 3 (w' , h )  E e ( EJ) } . 
h .  (w ,  e) PM G = F + D iff  
e ( G) = { (w' , g) : 3 (w', J) E e ( F ) 3 (w' , d) E e( D)  sth .  (w' , g) = (w' , fUd) } 
I .  (w , e )  PM G' � G iff 't:/(w', g) E e(G) 3 (w' , g' ) Ee( G' )  s . th .  g' � g.6  
Kamp&Reyle( 1 993 )  define accessibi l ity in  terms of a relat ion of  DRS-subordi­
nation 2: ,  which l argely corresponds to the hierarchical s t.ructure of DRSs . For 
our new DRS representation language , impl ic i t ly defined by ( 2 1 ) ,  th is  relation 
i s  extended by the clauses in  (22 ) .  ( 23 )  defines a special subord i n at i on relat i on 
« between context referents t hat m irrors the semantic relat ion < in ( 1 8 ) .  Thi s  
relat ion further constrains the  accessibi l ity of  context re ferents for anaphori c 
b inding (24 ) :  a context. referent X may not be bound to any referent Y that 
is ' l arger' than X ,  for such bin d ings wou ld  be in v iolation of wellfoundedness . 
(22 )  
a .  
b .  
c .  
d.  
( 2:3 ) 
a .  
b. 
c. 
d .  
For Ko a DRS ,  2: i s  the smal lest relation sat isfying condi t ions ( a-d ) :  
i f  G : :  F + K" E ConK2 & F : : X + K' E ConKl , Ko 2: KJ , Ko 2: Kz 
t.hen K' 2: K" and Kl 2: K' and K2 2: K" ; 
if G : : F + [{" 0 H : :  G + [{III E ConK" where Ko 2: K1 , 
then [{" 2: K ill , Kl 2: K" an d  Kl 2: /(111 ; 
if � G  : :  F + K" E Con/';l l where Ko 2: /(1 , t. hen KJ 2: K" ; 
K' 2: K' , and i f  /(' 2: /(" and K" 2: Kill then K' 2: K'II . 
For Ko a DRS ,  « i s  the small est relat ion to sat isfy condit ions ( a-d ) :  
i f  G : :  F+ K'E ConK] l Ko 2: [(1 , then F «  G and 't:/ZE UK ' :  Z « G;  
if G = F + D E ConKl l [(0 2: [(1 , then F «  G and  n «  G;  
if  G '  � G E ConK" [(0 2: [(1 , t hen G'  « G;  
i f  F « G and G « H then  F « II .  
( 24 )  A di scourse referent y E [h.;, i s accessible ,  wi th in  a D RS K ,  J{ 2: [{ ' , 
for a d i scourse referent ;T occurring i n  a D RS [(" 
i f  K' 2: K" and if :1:, y context referen t. s ,  t hen x 1:. y .  
4 .  Modal subordinat ion-what you can and cannot d o  
4 . 1 . Negat i o n  
Our analys is  accounts for modal subord i nat i on relati ve to negat. ion cOlltex t s  
( 1 .5 ) ,  where the modal b ase of the subj unct ive modal i s  anaphoric t o  the all-
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notating referent H of the negated update condition. According to ( 2 1 £) II 
denotes a set of collntf 1jactual states (w' ,  h ) ,  where w' of. w. And from (22 )­
(24 )  i t  follows that t he  referent x i s  accessible from the scope DRS of t he 
subordin ated modal The analysis also rules out cases l ike ( 25 ) :  the second 
sentence i s  nonmodal , and therefore cannot induce modal subord i nation i n  
terms of anaphoric binding to a context referen t .  S ince the context referent 
G' that is introduced by negation i s  not accessible as an i nput referent  for the 
update condition of the second sentence , the pronoun it cannot be bOllnd .7  
( 2.5 ) Clar issa doesn ' t  own a bike. # She loves i t .  
In  order to ru le  out  subordinat ion of  indicative cond i t ionals relat ive to negation 
contexts ( 26 ) ,  we adopt a pragmatic  constraint on senten ce mood, following 
Stalnaker ( 1 976 ) :  the denotat ion of the context referent 0' that annotat.es the 
restrictor of an indicative  cond i t ional must contai n  a state t hat is t ied to 
the evaluation world .  This  accounts for ( 9/ 1 5 )  vs. (26 ) :  s ince the negated 
antecedent context is coull t e lj"actual ( sec ( 2 l f) ) ,  indicati ve mood i s  ruled out .  
( 26 )  Fred d idn ' t  buy a microwave oven .  # He might use i t .  
4 - :2. Graded modality 
vVe also account for graded modal forces ( 29 ) ,  where for probably,. unlikely, 
etc. we assum e  a probabi l i ty measure p.8 In  (27 )  the condi t ional q uant ifies 
over ( sufficiently normal ) worlds/states where Max goes to China, and i s  ver­
i fied if those worlds  where he buys books in Ch ina are assigned a. sufficiently 
high relative probabi l i ty. Subordinat ion of the second sentence to the  scope 
of the graded condit ional  const rains i t s  universal quant ificat ion to range over 
worlds where Max buys books in  China ,  but now with restr i ction to what i s  
normally the case i n  su.ch a si tuation. The cond it ion is veri fled iff  all s tates that 
pertain to such normal worl d s  can be extended to satisfy the scope argument . 
( 27 )  If M a x  goes to Ch ina ,  he probably  buys books. Mary wi l l  adrn i n� t hem . 
In the structura.ll y  s imi lar (28 ) the modal quantifier i s  assigned the meaning 
of n o ,  which con strains the scope argument B of q to be the em pty set : under 
normal circumstances ?vlax w i l l  not buy books if he goes Ch ina. If  t he deno­
tation of G' and Gil were defined i n  terms of the sets A, H of the relat.ional 
quant i fier , we could not refer to Gil to establ ish a modal subordinat ion read i ng :  
Gil would denote the  empty set . Yet ,  according to  (2 1g )  Gil denotes t he fu l l  
( context dependent ) i ntension o f  the scope DRS ,  such tha.t by anaphoric rd­
erence to Gil in (28) the second modal un i versally quantifies over those rather 
abnormal worlds where Max buys books in China- again w i th relat i v i zation to 
worlds where things evolve as i s  n orm al for such a (quite abnormal ) s i tuat ion . 
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( 28 )  If I go to China , in  no case wi l l  I buy books. I wouldn ' t  read them . . 
A F G H  
F : : A + 
G : : F + 
H : : G + 
I C speaker( i )  china( c) I 
G' G il X' 
X'  = F 
G' : :  x' + 1 go-to( i , c )  I 0 Gil I z : :  G' + books (Z )  buy ( i , Z )  I 
H' H" X" 
�:' :�x9,"+D <> H" : : H' + I � T : :  II' + 1 read ( i , Z )  I I  
Our pragmati c  constraint OIl sentence mood�indicative modals arc relative 
to a context that contains a state that i s  tied to the evaluat ion world- is in 
accordance with ( 29a-c ,f) , but not with (29d -e) . 9 While unlikely and there 's a 
sligh t chance presumably both denote the quant ifier unlikely,  to be ass i gned 
a low relative probabi l i ty, the restrictions on sentence mood differ : (29 i )  i s  a 
possible cont inuation for ( 29d) but not for (2ge ) , wh i le (29 i i ) i s  fine  with ( 2ge) . 
( 29 )  a .  
b .  
c .  
d .  
e .  
f. 
If Max goes to China, he ( necessarily) wi l l  buy a book . 
If Max goes to China, he probably will buy a book . 
If Max goes to Ch ina ,  he might buy a book . 
If Max goes to China ,  th ere '05 a slight chance that he ' l l  buy a book . 
i .  He  will have a hard t ime read ing i t .  
If Max goes to Ch ina ,  it 's unlikely thal he wi l l  buy  a book . 
Max goes to China, in Tl O  case w i l l he buy a book . 
i .  # He wi l l  have a hard t ime reading i t .  
i i .  H e  would have a h ard t ime reading i t . 
For i nd icat ive moda.ls we assume the select ion funct ion * to be cen tered : the 
evaluat i on world figures with in the set of accessible nor'mal worl d s  where Max 
goes to Ch ina .  But  with unl ikely the s u bset of those worlds wh ere h e  in addi ­
tion buys books may or may not contai n the evaluation world .  \Ve suggest that 
the cont rast  in (29) i s  to be ca.ptured in terms of a ( pragmatic)  restr ict ion :  
for a slight chance the scope argument lJ in  t he denotat ion of unl ikely must 
contain the evaluation world , whi le i t  Illay not for unlikely. T h eSf� rest r ictions 
are i n  accordance with the monoton i ci ty properties of these qua.nt ifiers . 1 0 Fol­
l ow ing our  pragmatic conditions on sentence mood ,  anaphoric reference to the 
scope argument Gil of unlikely i s  t hen only l ic it for ( 29i i ) ,  whi le for a slight 
chance modal subord ination is poss i b le with indicat ive mood ( 29i ) . 1 1  
-1 . 3. Alodal subordination vs . accommodation 
We have shown that the anaphoric ana l ys i s  of modal subord i nat ion copes 
w i th  a wi de variety of data. Yet. , i t i s  not llll controvers ial that the anaphor i c 
approach is the right way to go ( see e .g .  Rohert.s ( 1 99.5 ) ) .  
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Let us first mention one immediate problem of the anaphoric approach , 
which,  however, can be resolved quite straightforwardly. ( 30 )  is  semant ical ly 
equivalent to  (28 ) ,  but structurally distinct . In (30 )  the context referent that 
represents the negated context is embedded within the cond i t ional 's scope and 
not accessible for the subsequent modal , to induce modal subord i nation . 
( 30 ) If Max goes to China,  he wil l  not buy books .  He would not read them .  
O n e  could take this as a weakness of the anaphoric/presupposi tional approach 
to modal subordination , and argue i nstead that the ' inherent '  force of subjunc­
t i ve mood is to refer to ( and accommodate) th e other case ,  computed as the  
complement ( set ) of  some access ible context ( see Corblill ( l994 ) ) .  But  bes ides 
the wellformed subordination cases (:30) and (9/ 1 5 )  this predicts ( 3 1 a) to mean 
that Fred would have been unhappy if he hadn 't got a letter! (3 1 b) shows that 
( anaphoric)  reference to the oth er case is only possi ble for otherwise. Instead ,  
we propose to analyze ( 30)  as  structurally equi valent to (28 ) ,  given the equiv­
alence of 'y'. and .3 . This can be defended in view of the syntax- semant ics 
in terface, s ince the ( implic i t )  modal quant ifier and sentent ial negation are both 
located within the functional proj ect ion of sentence st ruct ure .  
( 3 1 )  Fred got a letter today. a. # He would have been unhappy. 
b. Otherwise he wou l d  have been unha,ppy. 
Robert s ( l 995) expli c it ly argues against the a,naphori c approach . One of her 
central examples i s  ( :� 2 ) ,  which an anaphoric analysis i s  unable to handle. Yet ,  
(:32) does not strike u s  as a part i cularly coherent di scourse. 1 2  I t  requi res some 
addit ional inferencing, namely accommodation of the missing i n formation that 
the leprechaun A ndy could meet i s  one of those who have a pot of gold (or 
a flying carpet in  ( i )  of  fn . 1 2) .  But this accommodated i n formation doesn ' t  
correspond to the presupposed modal b ase o f  the cond i t ional in  (:32c ) . 1 3  
( 32) a. If Andy m et a leprechaun , he'd be del ighted , Robert s ( 1 995 , 6 74 )  
b .  Lepn�chauns sometimes have a pot of gold .  
c .  If Andy was rea.l ly lucky the  lepr [ . ]  m ight l e t  h im have some of i t .  
\"/e make a clear dist inct ion between the anaphorie arwlysi.s of modal subordi­
nation ,  w h i ch may i nvol ve a.ccommodation of t. he presupposed modal base i f  
no  appropriate antecedent referent i s  found ,  and accommodation of  otherwise 
presupposed ma.terial , w h i ch may contribute to enabl ing anaphor i c  b ind ing ,  
but  must  be tr iggered by presupposit ional c lements (e .g .  really lucky i n  (32 ) ) ,  
or,  as Roberts ( 1 995 )  poi nts  out ,  specific contextual l icensing condit ions .  This 
dist inct ion i s  i l lustrated by ( :3:3a b )  ( from Corblin ( l 9�H ) ) .  Speakers uniformly 
affirmed that-without the bracketed material--( :3:3h )  requires some further 
interpretation effort , as opposed to (:3:3 a) , which comes down to ' adding ' ,  o r  
aceommodaLing the i nformation that i s  carried by  t h e  bracketed otherwise. 
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(33)  a. Mary d idn ' t  g ive the name of the wi tness . 
( Jf she had done sol Otherwise) They would  have k i l led h im .  
F G H  
F · · l m Y x z  . .  mary{m) gangsters{Y) witness{x) name(z, x) I 
G : : F + 
H : : G + 
G' I -, G' : :  F + I give(m,z ,Y) I 
H' HI! X' 
X' C G '  
H' ::- X' + D 6 HI! : :  H' + I ki l l(Y ,x) 
b .  Mary gave the name of the w I tness . 
I 
( If she hadn't done  sol Otherwise) Thev would have k i lled her . -
F G H  1 m Y x z 
F : : m ary{m) gangsters{Y) witness{x) name{z,3:) I 
G : : F + give(m , z ,Y) J 
H' HI! X' 
H : : G + X' C G 
-, give(m,z, Y) I 6 HI !  : :  H' + I kil l (Y ,m)  H '  ::- X' + 1 1 
Kasper ( 1 992)  g i ves an analys is of s i mp le subjun ct i ve sentences as i nvolv ing 
impl i c i t ly restricted counterfactual con d i t ionals , which presuppose,  i n  the im­
pli c i t  antecedent c lause ,  "the preconditions for the poss i bi l i ty of the conse­
quent to be tr ue" . In ( 33a ) , th i s presupposition i s sati sfied by modal subordi­
nat ion or anaphoric binding of the modal base to the con tex t ( referen t )  G' , 
defined by negat ion i n  the first sentence. No accommodat ion i s  i n  order . In 
( 33b ) ,  by contrast-without realization of othe rwis e-t he DRS does not con­
tain any appropri ate context referent that could i n stantiate the mod al base 
of the i mp l ic it ly rest ricted condi t iona l , and at the same t ime sat i sfy t h i s  spe­
c ific presuppos it ion . Choos i ng the factual antecedent context G as modal base 
of the counterfactual , the "precond i t ions for the consequent to become t rue" 
mus t therefore be accommodated into the res tr i ctor D RS :  the  most straightfor­
ward condi t ion that com es to mind , here, i s  that Mary d idn ' t  gi ve the w i tness '  
name. It i s  t h i s  add i t ional accommodation 'effort '  that w e  believe makes (33b )  
s l igh t ly ' harder ' to  process as  compared to (33a) . 
In sum ,  t hen ,  we consi der examples l ike ( 3 1 a ) ,  (32)  an d (3 3 b ) to be 
d i st i n ct from modal subordination pmper, which we concei ve of as a spec i a l in ­
stance of 1'eiat ive modality, a n d  which we analyzed i n  terms of anaphoric b ind­
ing/accommoda tion of the modal 's anaphoric modal base X' .  The examp les 
that at first s ight seem to be problemat i c for t h i s  ' syntact i cally cond i t ioned ' 
an aphor i c approach were shown to invol ve accommodation, i n  part icu lar ,  ac­
com modat ion of fu rt her mater ial , dist inct  from the anaphori c modal base . 
S ince ,  as Roberts ( 1 995 )  points out , accommodation i s  to be licensed pragm a.t i ­
cally, the ease or d ifficulty o f  process i n g  examp les l ike ( 3 1 a ) ,  ( 32 ) ,  o r  (33b ) w i l l  
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be heavily dependent on the parti cul ar contextual setup, or the ' willingness ' 
of the interpreter to do accommodat ion more or less gratuitously. We consider 
i t  as a pro of the anaphoric approach that i t  captures this d ist inction .  
5 .  Conclusion 
We have given a unified analysis of relative modality and modal subordina­
t ion ,  based on a new DRT representation format that expl icit ly represents the 
contextual dynamics of discourse. The analys is accounts for a wider range of 
data than previ ous DRT approaches : in  part icular , i t  improves over Roberts '  
and Geurts '  reconstructions of  Kratzer ' s  theory of modali ty i n  that a l l  relevant 
contextual parameters of modal constructions are represen ted at the level of 
the D RS .  We have shown how to solve the problem of wel lfoundedncss t.hat 
was imported by use of our new representat ion format , and formulated syn­
tacti c  constraints on anaphoric b inding ,  which also preserve wel l foundedness . 
The analys is  characterizes modal subordination as an anaphori c  phe­
nomenon , a special instance of relative modality. We argue that examples that 
seem problemat ic  for the anaphoric approach to modal subordination can be 
solved , i f  we clearly dist inguish between modal subordination proper, wh ich is 
restr icted in terms of syntacti c condit ions on anaphoric binding, and accommo­
dation, which is dependent on cont.extual and pragmat ic l icen sing condit ions .  
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2 A complex modal base i s  used for the analysis of deontic modality ( see 3 . 3 . ) .  
3 See also Kam p&Rey le( 1 996 ) , Kamp ( 1 996 ) . Their defin it ion of relat ional se­
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5 ( 2 1 )  i s  based on the s impler language DRLi' , defined i n  ( i )  and ( i i ) .  Here 
and in ( 2 1 ) we assume Kamp&Reyle 's ( 1 993 , 1 996) syntax and verifi cat ion con ­
ditions for atomic DRS cond i t ions .  The verification of update cond i t ions ( i i . e )  
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only defines the context change potent ial for J{I relat i ve to F. Nothing fo l lows 
from ( i i . e ) as to the truth of III relative to (w, e) . Assertion of truth is defined 
by the truth predicate ( i .f ) , appl ied t o  a context referent G. The predicate is 
verified by (w , e ) iff there is a state (wl , g) E e ( G) with WI = w . Instead of a 
s imple assert ive DRS III we thus construct a complex structure, cons i st ing of 
an update condit ion G : =  F + /(1 together wi th the truth predicate v G. Yet ,  
w e  refrain from using a special trut h  predicate i n  the representation l anguage . 
Instead we chose the more constrained language that is imp l i c i tly defined by 
( 2 1 ) ,  where assertion of truth is bui lt into the verification condition of updates . 
( i ) e. G : = F + /(1 f. v G  g. -, v G  h .  G Q H .  
( i i )  e .  (w ,  e) FM G : = F + [{I iff 
e (G )=  { (wl , g) : 3 (wl , f) E e ( F ) s . th .  (w' ,e-<Guj) []{/] (w' .g) } '  
f. (1O , e ) F M  v G  iff 3 (w , g) E e ( G) . 
g. ( 10 ,  e) FM -, v C;  i ff  -, ( 3 (10 , 09) E e rG) ) . 
h .  ( w ,  e ) FAI G Q H iff (A ,  B) E Q1JanLM(Q ) ,  where 
A = { ( wl , g) : (wl , g) E e (G )  &: WI E * (1O , e ( G) ) } & 
B = { (wl , g) : (wl , g) E e (G) &: WI E * (w , e ( G) )  &: 
V(wl , g) : (WI , g) E e rG) &: WI E * (1O , e ( G) )  -+ 3 (wl , h ) E e (H) } . 
6 Cont e .rt reduction ( 2 1 . i )  i s  used for counterfactual s  and deont i c  modal i ty. 
7 Yet ,  w e  account for cases like l'vfa x  doesn 't o wn a car. So h e  doesn 't h a ve to 
park it .  The input referent of the negated condi t ion of the second sentence can 
refer to the annotat i ng referent of the n egated condit ion of the first sentence. 
8 E.g . , QuantM (pmbably) ( A ,  B )  = { (A , B ) :  P(cs (A )  n cs ( B ) ) / P(cs ( A ) ) :::-
. 7.5 } , with probab i l i ty P defi ned for sets of worlds cS ( il ) ,  cs (B ) ,  with A ,  B as 
i n  ( 2 1g )  and cs ( X ) = {WI :  ( 3 .r/ ) (WI , x )  E X} . 
9 For indicative rnoda l s  the normalcy select ion funct ion is centered . So , i n  all 
of (29a�f )  the evaluation wor l d  is  among the normal worlds quant i fied over . 
Th i s  predicts the i nd icat i ve (29i ) for (29a- c ) and subjunct ive (29 i i )  for ( 29f ) .  
1 0 See Kibble ( 1996 ) ,  who i ndependent l y  i nvest igates modal subordinat ion w i th 
graded modals ,  but doesn ' t  take into accoun t  constrai n t s  on mood . 
1 1 However , i n  ( i ) , w i t h  modal su bord i nat ion rel at i ve to the  rcst r ictor a rgu­
men t , ind icative mood i s  l i censed , which is pred i cted ( see {n . 9 ) .  
( i ) If I g o  to Ch ina, i t ' s u n l i ke l y  that I ' ll buy books .  I ' ll v is i t  m onu lIlen t s .  
\ 2 The reason (32 ) might be cons idered as coherent could  be due to the u s e  o f  
the k i nd -denoting N P  gold in possessi ve construct ion . Consider ( i ) ,  for com ­
pari son , which is worse than ( 32 ) .  Speakers who accept the Germ an eq uivalent 
of ( i )  suggest that i t  gets bet ter i f  the anaphor ihn for the carpet i s  replaced 
by e inen (one� anaphora ) ,  w h i ch i s general ly avai lable in pos i t i on s  that do not 
al low for indiv idual-�type anaphora, and thus cal l s  for a separate an alys i s .  
( i )  I f  A n d y  met a u n icorn , he'd b e  del ighted . Un i corns somet i mes have a 
fl y i n g  carpet . If A ndy asked i t k i Jl (lly, the uni corn m ight gi ve i t  to h i m . 
n I nstead , i t  correspon d s  to the  presuppos i t ion that i s  triggered with in the  
cond i t ional 's anteceden t ,  b y  t h e  phrase really lucky, which i s ,  t h en ,  respons ible 
for the local acco m m odation of t h i s  ' m i ss i ng ' add i t i onal assum ptioll .  
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